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THE STREETCORNER PRESS: WORKER INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS 
* IN LOUREN~O MARQUES, 1900-1962 
By Jeanne Penvenne 
In 1970 Sara Berry wrote a piece for African Urban Notes pointing to the 
need for further research on the marketing of migrant labor services in African 
cities.
1 
How did migrants find employment, how did they work their way up, 
and how did they acquire necessary skills? The problems are important for an 
understanding of the process of proletarianization and the commitment of African 
migrants to urban wage labor. Clearly they are only one aspect of a complex 
problem, but they form an important aspect. 
In my research on the history of African labor in Lourenro Marques (today 
Maputo), Mozambique, I focused on these problems as part of a detailed interview 
pr.ogram. In our world of classified newspaper ads--help wanted, rentals, etc.--
the press offers us a basic foot in the door upon arrival in a new city. In 
Lourengo Marques, word-of-mouth commnnication was the medium of worker 
intelligence--their foot-in the door. The chatter on street corners, at public 
fountains, bars, markets, and in the endless lines where Africans waited for 
any number of reasons, often centered upon economic concerns--good jobs, good 
working conditions, and employers to be avoided. In deference to the conference 
theme ("Africa and the Media: Changing Aspects of Communication"), I have 
referred to these communication networks as the streetcorner press. 
The paper addresses the problems of access to job opportunities, labor 
mobility and, briefly, training opportunities in Louren90 Marques. How did 
informants find suitable jobs, move into better jobs, and generally look out 
for their best interests? The paper concerns the period from 1900, when 
*This paper was presented at the 1979 annual meeting of the African Studies 
Association, in Los Angeles, 31 October-3 November 1979. 
construction and port activity expanded significantly, making Louren90 Marques 
the largest employment center in southern Mozambique, to the early 1960s when 
Portuguese strategy to counter the effects of armed resistance brought about a 
qualitative change in local patterns of labor mobility. The paper is based on 
archival research and interviews with one hundred of the city's oldest male 
workers--women in this period were seldom wage earners. Interviews included 
detailed family, migration, and employment histories, thus generating information 
on any number of job experiences from domestic service to chaufreuring. 2 
' 
The intell_igence networks operative for a ~igrant seeki_ng work in Louren<io 
Marques for the first time depended upon a number of factors. In the early 
twentieth century, the African workers' physical mobility was relatively 
1.ll).restrained. They could come and go at will, since there were neither the laws 
3 
nor the police force to prevent them. Local clans still held land within the 
2 
city, and the definition of black city/white city was still relatively muddled. 
Intelligence networks were relatively open, since workers were free to look around 
and ask questions. Constraints on African mobility--from pass laws, to curfews, 
to labor registration--were built up at great cost throughout the century in an 
effort to generate labor at below-market wages. 
For volunteer labor the straightforward approach to employment--walking around 
asking for work--was the most common. The same easy-entry, unskilled occupations 
characteristic of labor-intensive technologies existed in Louren~o Marques as 
in other colonial ports. Basic tote, lift and sweep jobs were available in 
construction, private homes, businesses, and at the port. Migrants could quickly 
ascertain which construction sites were hiring, which residential areas were 
likely to have work, and where casual labor gathered daily for port work. 
Construction, hod carryi_ng and domestic service were the most connnon bridging 
occupations. 4 Young men were apt to seek live-in domestic service to ease their 
way into the city, whereas migrants coming to Louren~o Marques as mature adults, 
often after many contracts at the Transvaal mines, preferred construction or 
casual port labor which paid a bit more, was a good deal more strenuous, and 
allowed them to live independently. 5 The skills required for such jobs were 
simply strength, discipline, and sobriety. 
For young migrants seeking work independently, relatives, fellow countrymen, 
,. 
and schoolmates were key contacts in the urban area--the central core of the 
migrant's intelligence information. But not all Mozambicans first came to 
Louren~o Marques as volunteer workers. Many first worked as conscript laborers 
who had been seized at n_ight in their homes by administration police and marched 
off to work a three-to twelve-month contract. These contracts were called 
shibalo, or forced labor. Shibalo workers lived in the city in employer-owned 
sheds or compounds apart from other workers. They received a token wage while 
on the job, and their full wage upon repatriation to the home area. They were 
the designated true migrant workers. There was no intention to allow these 
workers to work their way up in the city. Most shibalo worked at the port and 
rail complex, on state construction or at the Department of Public Works. 6 Many 
were forced or allowed to work nights and Sundays doing odd jobs in the private 
sector, thus expanding their uban work experience. 7 Occasionally a migrant 
returned after a shibalo contract to work for the same employer as a volunteer at 
twice his former wage. 
Shibalo must be considered an important bridging occupation, and shibalo 
workers formed important links in migrant intelligence networks. Some workers 
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did not have to locate an urban job, it was found for them. One-eighth of my 
informants came to the city as shibalo. Many many more came as volunteers because 
of shibalo. 8 Workers who returned home after a shibalo contract soon informed 
their neighbors that shibalo was to be avoided. Those who were chronically 
seized for shibalo were characterized elsewhere in Africa as, "the meek, the 
weak and the slow.n 9 The description suits Mozambique. The threat of shibalo 
4 
was sufficient to convince men to seek a permanent position in LOuren~o Marques 
to escape the chronic harrassment of shibalo raids. one informant put it bluntly: 
I came to work in Lourengo Marques because of shibalo. 
I couldn't s~eep in my own home. I lived like a dog 
going into the bush to sleep at night because there 
were so many police seizing people. 10 
Many came to settle in the city after becoming tired of the vicious circle of 
working on mine contracts only to return home and be taken for shibalo. The 
shibalo contract meant neglect of one's investment in the rural area, and many men 
found it necessary to return to the mines afterwards in order to recoup their 
11 losses. 
The threat of shibalo contributed to the importance of solid worker 
intelligence. If shibalo was the consequence of an error in judgement, it was 
a costly error. If an employer defaulted on wage payments, thus making the 
worker unable to pay his tax, his resulting insolvency threatened both him and 
his family with shibalo, since women were routinely seized for road or 
agricultural work in rural areas if their spouses failed to pay the tax. 12 An 
important function of the streetcorner press was therefore to identify people 
who defaulted on wages, or mistreated their employees. such empwoyers always 
found it difficult to get and keep labor. 
All sources fully document the prevalence of nonpayment and physical abuse 
by Portuguese employers, particularly with regard to domestic service. 13 Various 
directors of the Native Affairs Department (hereafter, the SNI) answered 
complaints of labor shortages by the white community charging that if employers 
_paid their employees well, on time, and treated them appropriately, there would 
not be such severe shortages. 14 City firms with reputations for good wages 
and conditions always had sufficient volunteers. 
Domestic service provides an interesting example of a bridging occupation, 
and highlights the efficiency of the streetcorner press. Domestics are often 
neglected by labor historians, yet throughout the twentieth century domestics 
comprised nearly half the African wage labor force of Louren~o Marques. 15 
Despite periodic campaigns by the a&ninistration and local employers to alter 
the character of domestic service it remained a male occupation. Young males 
tended to take the unskilled jobs and adults the semi-skilled and skilled jobs. 
In 1914, when the introduction of mechanized coal loading at the port displaced 
hundreds of youths who formerly toted basketfulls of coal on their heads, the 
white press, the African press, and the SNI all advocated employing these youths 
in unskilled domestic service instead of those strong adult males whose muscle 
could be put to more productive use elsewhere in the city's labor-starved 
economy. 16 . This campaign was relatively successful, since the youngsters worked 
for lower wages than the adults whom they replaced. 
Subsequent campaigns advocated replacing young males with adult females. 17 
Interestingly, these campaigns coincided with the introduction of plantation 
crops which dependent upon the cheap labor of women and minors to harvest them 
economically. 18 Young males were furthermore considered to be troublesome. 19 
They were not yet in the position of having to hold a job in order to meet their 
personal and family responsibilities, and were considered dangerously mobile. 
Adult women did not like the constraints of life in domestic service, and 
European women preferred male servants, except for the position of childs' nurse. 
Portuguese women felt there was insufficient social distance with female servants 
and perceived them as a sexual threat to their households. 2° City registration 
records for African labor from 1947 to 1962 reveal that women comprised only a 
very small and unstable percentage of domestic servants. 21 
The most characteristic aspect of domestic service was the high r.ate of 
turnover. Young men entered domestic service, learned Portugues do quintal 
(backyard Portuguese), and from there began to work their way up. They did so 
by making the best use of their intelligence networks. It has been asserted 
5 
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that domestics remained marginal to the main currents of urban worker resistance 
in the colonial period due to their isolation in white households. It was thought 
that they had little free time to exchange information with other workers, and 
therefore were unaware of their mutual plight. Indeed, domestics had very little 
time off--usually only a few hours on Sunday afternoons--but their chores brought 
them into daily contact with hundreds of other domestics. 22 
In the early twentieth century, domestics gathered three or four times daily 
to draw the household water at the public fountain. Thro.ughout the century they 
gathered in queues at the bakery several times daily for fresh bread. There 
•Were always groups of servants at the post office and municipal market. The 
bakery, fountain, and market were to the domestic what the working persons' bar 
was to the port and construction worker. The shop talk at servants' gathering 
places greatly diminished their structural isolation. Their errands took them 
all over town, and in fact they enjoyed more diverse contacts than dockworkers, 
for example, who spent most of their working lives within the confines of the 
port zone. 
A typical employers' complaint was that their servants dawdled while on ah 
errand. The broad contacts enjoyed by servants were viewed suspiciously by 
employers. These contacts allowed domestics to improve their marketable skills--
by learning Portuguese, for instance--and gave them a better idea what their 
skills were worth. They all compared wages, conditions, and job requirements. 
It is no wonder that the Secretary General in his 1910 Report warned employers 
to contract a good servant up north in Quelimane where wages were low, and then 
to keep him away from other servants so that he wouldn't get any notions about 
what constituted an acceptable wage. 23 
Suspicion and resentment were characteristic of relations between master 
and servant. The European community was dependent upon servants to maintain 
its standard of livi.ng, but until the mid-1950s the city had a chronic shortage 
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of domestics, and employers felt that shortage allowed them to command wages 
quite unjustified by their skills. Employers commonly described their servants 
as "slow and inefficient, 11 11 arftul liars, 11 underskilled and overpaid 11 lazy 
tyrants," who when they felt themselves mistreated would simply quit and live at 
large in the city as thieves .24 Work slowdowns and ill.egal wage subsidies 
implicit in the above remarks were indeed part of worker strategies in the city. 
The fact that intelligence networks were broad among domestics facilitated the 
fencing of stolen goods, and to some extent justified employers' fears of theft. 25 
Domestics in the early century were relatively well paid and well informed 
about the urban labor economy. They worked in close contact with whites and 
enjoyed the privileges and dangers of that intimacy •. They were, in general, an 
upwardly mobile group. Given this situation it is hardly surprising that the 
first serious efforts to control African labor in Louren~o Marques--efforts to 
set maximum wages and to severely curb labor mobility--were aimed directly at 
this group. Nor is i:t surprisi.ng that this diverse and resourceful group 
resisted and circumvented controls, trying to preserve their mobility wherever 
possible. 
The Native Labor Regulations, passed in 1904 and 1906, were never implemented 
for the entire urban labor force as originally intended since there were neither 
the proper channels nor the manpower to enforce the r.egulations city-wide. 26 
In 1905 the police and the SNI tried to respond to the pressure of the white 
cornmuni ty and enforce the 11unworkable 11 regulation:; at least for the servants of 
the white residential area. All servants in the upper city were to register 
within fifteen days. They would receive a metal tag identifying those who had 
complied with the law. 28 The tags were intended to clear the white area of 
so-called vagrants, and to discourage worker turnover. The word quickly 
circulated in the streetcorner press that the police only checked to see that 
workers had registration tags, and if so, inquired no further. Migrants began 
registering simply to get the t.ag. They then continued worki.ng wherever they 
received the best wage, leavi.ng freely if abused. When the police caught up with 
them, they claimed their tag was lost or stolen and eventually reregistered 
under another name. Most often they were not recognized. 29 
Bogus registration was another strategy which quickly circulated through 
the quiet networks. Some Portuguese and Indians made a sideline of registering 
servants for their homes or businesses in exchange for a flat fee. The duly 
r.egistered servant, then no lo_nger a v_agrant vulnerable to arrest, was free to 
explore the city's streetcorner press for the best jobs without harrassment. 30 
Workers devised ever more evasive strategies, and as soon as the police thought 
they had foiled one scheme, they became aware of yet another. 
Resistance to registration by domestics became so widespread that in 1909 
the governor general ordered a crackdown. All Africans accused of being 
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unregistered, or not in proper observation of the regulation, were summarily 
sentenced by the police commissioner to three months of shibalo. 31 The crackdown 
severely altered patterns of job acquisition and drove volunteer labor to other 
markets, thus exacerbating local shortages and increasing dependence on shibalo. 32 
By 1915 casual noncompliance was again the rule, but during that year the 
newspaper of a local African and Afro-Portuguese club, the Gremio Africano, 
· published a number of articles attacking the regulation as exploitive. All over 
the city domestics followed the between-the-lines advocacy of noncompliance and 
the result was a boycott, one of the most widespread protest movements ever 
attempted by Mozambicans in Lourenco Marques. The police met the resistance 
~ 
with wholesale arrests, sentencing 2,271 men and women to shibalo. The 
following year arrests dropped to 1,892, still a substantial figure for a labor 
force of about 13,00o. 34 The police chief blamed the newspaper, but the movement 
had its origins as much in the streetcorner press as in the formal press. 35 
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Workers realized these regulations could force them into unwanted jobs 
and keep them there under threat of penal sanction. The regulations significantly 
curbed access to and use of local worker intell.igence to pursue the best available 
opportunities. These workers were not about to give in to control easily. The 
mass arrests had the same effect in 1915-1917 as the crackdown of 1909--
Mo:zambicans simply went elsewhere to market their skills. The Transvaal mines 
absorbed the overflow, and as long as that outlet remained open, "voting with 
one I s feet 11 was a viable strategy. The impact of the resistance on the city was 
a shortage of domestic servants. White residents complained that enforcement 
of the regulations turned out to be contrary to their interests. One sarcastically 
expressed the hope that the first African to be shibaloed would be the police 
chief's houseboy. 36 
Relations between family and servant were not always as strained as described 
here. There were cases where a man and his family continued as servants to the 
same employer for gener.ations. 37 Some employers took an interest in their 
servants' future and sincerely tried to help them find a secure and well paid 
job. Informants were frank in expressing their warm feelings toward employers 
who helped them and remained their friends. 38 Getting a good job, and working 
up to better jobs, involved more than finding out about the job through the 
streetcorner press. At this level a worker needed a little help from his friends, 
and in some cases this meant finding and cultivating an appropriate friend. 
This friend could be an African or a European, but the best jobs required a 
European friend, a padrinho ,· godfather, or cunha, "wedge, n as they were called. 
A job in the slaughterhouse, for example, was considered a relatively 
good job for unskilled labor. It was steady work. The port and rail complex 
paid a higher wage for similar work, but the port was not steady work. 
Slaughterhouse informants said that one could only get into port work with 
family connections. 39 In the course of interviews, however, it turned out that 
nearly all the slaughterhouse workers had been hired with the help of a friend 
or a relative at the slaughterhouse. 40 It seems that one needed a friend to 
work at the slaughterhouse too. 
Cultivating a useful friend was a good part_of what upward mobility was all 
about. The Portuguese patronage system was pervasive, but it was particularly 
important at the port where there were good jobs for both blacks and whites at 
stake. The literature on patron-client relationships is vast and complex, but 
for our purposes the characteristics outlined by Keith Legg, and discussed by 
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Jos~ Cutileiro are sufficient. 41 According to Legg, "Patron client relationships 
would appear to have the following attributes: (1) The partners control non-
comparable resources, (2) the relationships are 'personalized,' and (3) the 
decision to exchange is based on a perception of mutual benefit and reciprocity." 42 
It is therefore not a market.exchange. Cutileiro places patronage in the 
Portuguese context, and helps us understand how the institution historically 
combined with racism to undermine worker solidarity in Mozambique by coopting 
the best paid workers. According to Cutileiro the patronage system was based on 
the understanding that 
the number of thi_ngs in life to which one may have access is very 
small, and •.• most of the things to which one aspires are obtainable 
only through privilege. This privileged situation is, in its turn, 
attainable only through the protecti-on of someone close to the ultimate 
source of the benefit needed. To secure such protection a personal 
bond has to be created. A whole network of patronage is one of 
excha_nged favors between private individuals often subsumed under 
the institutions of spiritual kinship or friendship .•• Implicit in 
the general acceptance of patronage is the notion that society is 
wrongly organized in some basic way and that individual rather 
than collective efforts are the only means of attempting to 
avoid this predicament.43 
The key observation here is the prevalence of individual over collective 
strategy at the level of upwardly mobile workers. The unskilled domestics who 
boycotted the Regulation for Native Labor acted as a group, but in an effort 
to further individual needs. Workers who remained in what were considered 
strictly black jobs had little experience with patronage. Patronage was the 
access avenue for those who aspired to what was considered a white privilege--
11 
d d 11 'd . b 44 a goo, stea y, we pai JO. For aspiring Africans the most common institution 
of spiritual kinship in the patron.age system was the. godparent. Among whites, 
mulattoes, and better-off,old, local African families this was a formal institution, 
fully ritualized. The institution did lend itself to extension, however, and 
often ministers and SNI administrators were cultivated as patrons under the 
godparent rubric. 45 
The port and rail complex offers a good example of patron.age among the 
upwardly mobile because many of the best African jobs in the city were port and 
rail jobs. Guilherme de Brito, son of the one-time director of the railway 
complex, and himself a railway and port administrator since 1939, is a classic 
example of a godfather, padrinho. De Brito was the godfather of dozens of 
African children, and the best man in dozens of weddings. He was an approachable 
man, and in exchange for looking after his godchildren De Brito never lacked 
fresh eggs, meat, fish, produce, prestige, and labor for any number of projects. 
De Brito was also a sought-after patron because, as a Mozambican-born 
Portuguese, he was less likely to return to Portugai. 46 As Cutileiro observed, 
"the need to find a patron (was) a frequent and recurrent phenomenon ... 47 
Several informants described cases where a good patron was cultivated for years, 
only to have him return to Portugal leaving dozens of clients without that 
cunha ("wedge") they needed to intercede on their behalf. 48 
The concensus was that to get ahead one had to have a padrinho. The more 
powerful the padrinho, the better one's chances for success. One cultivated a 
padrinho by bei.ng a ngood boy," literally~ rapaz, the phrase used by the 
workers themselves. 49 A relative or friend could serve a function similar to 
that of padrinho to secure a desireable job, such as the case of the slaughterhouse, 
but only a white padrinho would serve for the best jobs. 
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The cultivation of a patron was not to be taken lightly. Worker intelligence 
networks quickly impressed this fact upon the uninformed--the stakes were high. 
At the port every informant who had an office job before independence attributed 
his successful promotion to the intercession of a white patron. 
One case is worth desribing to illustrate the point. Bandi Albasini Chibindji 
had completed primary school at the Swiss Missions in 1936, making him one of the 
best-educated Mozambicans at that time. After serving in the military as a 
conscript, Chibindji petitioned for a job at the port in 1941. He got the job 
after six months. He began leading and unloading goods on trains at 12$00 
(twelve escudos) a day--just double the wage earned by shibalo labor, and shibalo 
labor received free room and board. Chibindji's wage was the same as that 
earned by most volunteer hod carriers at the port. Chibindji took the qualifying 
exam for every opening at the port and rails for the next few years, but despite 
his p~eferred status as a military veteran, his successful performance on the 
exams and the added responsibility of each new job, he continued to move 
horizontally, without any increment in wages. 
During this period Chibindji maintained an excellent work record, and 
cultivated the friendship of Sr. Pinto Maior who worked at the wharf office. 
In 1956, when a position as office assistant opened, Chibindji took the exam, 
passed it, and with the help of Sr. Pinto Maior, got the job. In his new job 
Chibindji earned 45$00 a day, triple his former wage. Forty-five escudos a 
day was about the highest wage an African could command at that time. 
Unfortunately, Pinto Maior retired to Lisbon. Chibindji then made friends 
with a woman who worked in the port office, and whose husband was an important 
figure at the port. Chibindji did the family's laundry without charge, brought 
them fresh eggs, goat meat, or chickens and did occasional odd jobs. The 
woman gave Chibindji her husband's old shirts, and in 1960 when a position as 
office auxiliary opened she prevailed on her husband to speak on his behalf. 
He got the job and increased his wage to 65$00 a day. In 1968 Chibindji was 
promoted to office auxiliary of the second class with the help of the same man. 50 
Chibindji was not atypical. Guilherme de Brito, who enjoyed an overview 
of port and rail personnel practices for nearly forty year~ frankly admitted 
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that passi.ng a qualifying exam meant little if one did not have a proper padrinho, 
indeed the best padrinho on the selection committee. 51 
Skill acquisition was by no means the key to a good job. Chibindji's case 
illustrates De Brito's point that passing a qualifying exam did not mean getting 
the job. Similarly, having acquired a skill or an education did not mean one 
would get the opportunity to use it; and being given the opportunity to use the 
skill or education did not mean getting paid as a skilled worker. Chibindj i 
completed his primary school education twenty years before he was given an 
9pportunity to use it and be paid for it. Chibindji had worked at the port and 
rail authority fifteen years loading and unloading trains and boats before 
becoming an office worker~ 
Even Chibindji's ultimate success is not to be taken uncritically. As an 
office worker Chibindji did typing, filing, accounting, and trained incoming 
white employees who were then promoted while Chibindji was not. They had the 
authority to sign the letters Chibindji composed and typed, and Chibindji was 
expected to sweep up and dust the office. Clearly there were white skills and 
black skills, and there were limits to black upward mobility no matter how 
powerful one's padrinho.52 
The thrust of Portugal's history of colonial prop.aganda was her claim to 
bring so-called civilization to the so-called uncivilized. Yet her record of 
educational and training inil:-iatives, at least until the late 1950s, was dismal. 
Programs were ill-conceived, badly funded, and often never got beyond the 
planni.ng stage, or once started they were allowed to lapse. What traini.ng 
programs did exist were scarcely embraced by those they.were intended to serve. 
The heart of the problem was that the state was unwilling to pay black trainees 
an appropriate wage. The principal motive for initiating the programs was to 
lower the cost of skilled labor. 
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Administrators expressed surprise when qualified Africans failed to volunteer 
to enter state nurses' training, teacher training or agricultural training 
schools. 53 Africans with primary education certificates had received them only 
with great sacrifice and support from their families, and to then enter a 
government apprentice pr.ogram at a wage equal to that received by shibalo was 
unacceptable. The administration found it necessary to force students into the 
training programs. 54 
There was more to African reluctance to enter state training pr.ograms than 
the inadequate wage. It was painfully evident that those Africans who had 
acquired an education and skills were often unsuccessful in their struggle to 
compete with white labor. Skilled white craftsmen, for example, were not about 
to train Africans if the end result was to encourage stiffer competition. The 
licensing system was used to keep African, and some Indian, craftsmen from 
competing with whites. Portuguese shoemakers could put pressure on the 
administration not to grant a permit to operate to an African shoemaker, alleging 
that there were already sufficient shoemakers in the area, or they could lobby 
to see that the African was only granted a permit if he set up shop in an 
Af . f th 1 · h' k 55 rican area, away rom e more ucrative w ite mar et. 
Training programs bogged down because of such hositilities. Brito Camacho, 
commissioner of Mozambique in the early twenties, for example, undertook an 
experiment to train Africans in woodworking. He arranged for a group of soldiers 
to apprentice at a local workshop at no cost to the shop. In response to the 
solders' complaints that they were not being trained, Camacho investigated and 
found that the soldiers were simply being used as unpaid labor to bring in wood 
supplies and to do the lifting, carrying, and sweepi.ng in the shop--appropriate 
African jobs. The soldiers were sent back to the barracks and the experiment 
declared a failure. 56 
Native Affairs Director Cabral tried to work out a satisfactory compromise 
in the mid-1920s by advocati.ng that African artisans be trained to serve 
African needs and not to compete with Europeans in the cities. He ignored the 
fact that the rural areas could not generate sufficient demand to support these 
artisans. 57 Local wages were not high enough to generate the vigorous local 
economy which could support artisans. This same depressed local economy failed 
to generate informally trained artisans and entrepreneurs. It was not until the 
dramatic wage increases of the early 1960s that the local economy received the 
necessary boost, and then artisans and entrepreneurs of ali sorts proliferated. 58 
In summary it seems fair to say that access to formal training was limited 
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by inappropriate and inconsistent state efforts, and informal training was limited 
by the weak African consumer market. Both formal and informal training were 
compromised by racist licensing and hiring practices. Many informants said 
that they never wanted to learn an art or be self-employed because, even though 
the profits made by a self-employed person were his own, there was often no 
work, or the authorities made work very difficult. They felt it was safer to 
have an employer. 59 As one of Marvin Harris's informants remarked in 1957, 
If it wasn't for my family I would go to Durban. 
There if you work hard and know your art, at least 
you're paid for it. But here the administration 
won't let me buy a motor for my saw.60 
Clearly the aspects of African labor considered in this paper are only a 
small part of an overall picture of migration and proletarianization, but they 
provide a useful measure of the commitment of migrants to urban wage labor, and 
illustrate the extent to which workers manipulated their own fate. The paper 
seeks to show that Mozambicans working in Louren9O Marques availed themselves 
of the streetcorner press to examine the constraints and opportunities which 
confronted them, and to keep abreast of strategies to advance their individual 
and mutual interests given those factors. 
Worker solidarity was enhanced through the streetcorner press which 
contributed to mutual worker awareness, but at the level of higher-paid, salaried 
positions the worker intelligence networks fed into the patronage system which 
undermined worker solidarity. All workers recognized that administrative and 
employer schemes to force the worker into a firm contract commitment with penal 
sanctions for breach of contract, to l.egislate wages, thus ignoring market 
factors, and to control worker access to urban opportunities, were intended to 
curb the workers' ability to profitably market their skills. 
Workers similarly recognized that most avenues of upward mobility were 
controlled by whites. Given this situation many ambitious Mozambicans took 
the route suggested by Harris's informant and worked in South Africa. Many 
others, like Chibindji, manipulated the system in Mozambique to their own ends. 
But most workers saw little point in fighting the system--the odds were too 
great--and they had insufficient training and skill to manipulate the system. 
They chose instead to circumvent controls as far as possible, and to advance 
their own interests through indirect or covert action, such as work slow-downs, 
petty thefts, and the like. It was not until the 1950s that a group of 
Mozambicans presented a serious and resolute challenge to the system which had 
progressively proscribed African access to opportunity. The founders of 
FRELIMO (Frente de Liberta9ao de Mo9ambique) did not share the notion that 
"individual rather than collective efforts" were the only way to deal with a 
society "wro_ngly o_rganized in some basic way. 11 
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